Reference note · Legal concepts and terminology
Supervision is not compensation: supervisory duties and civil liability
Why a supervisory failure does not automatically give an individual a right to compensation — and why the question nevertheless remains a legal one.
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§ 1Public-interest supervision
Financial supervisory authorities act on the basis of statutory mandates that pursue public-interest objectives such as financial stability, market integrity and the protection of clients as a group. Their powers and duties are defined by EU instruments — including Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 for the European Central Bank’s supervisory tasks and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and No 1095/2010 for the EBA and ESMA — and by national law.
§ 2No automatic individual right
In Case C-222/02 Peter Paul and Others (judgment of 12 October 2004), the Court of Justice of the European Union held that, provided the compensation of depositors prescribed by Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes is ensured, that directive does not preclude a national rule under which the supervisory authority acts only in the public interest, with the result that individuals cannot claim damages for defective supervision. It held the same for the banking coordination directives then in force (Directives 77/780/EEC, 89/299/EEC and 89/646/EEC). The Court reasoned that those directives did not confer on depositors a right to have the competent authorities take supervisory measures in their interest.
The judgment has clear limits. It concerned specific directives that have since been replaced; it rested in part on the existence of the deposit-guarantee compensation; and it concerned the liability of the supervisory authority, not that of a bank towards its client. It does not establish that EU law excludes every claim against a supervisor, nor that national law may not provide for such claims. It nevertheless illustrates a general distinction: a supervisory rule may exist without creating an individual right to compensation.
§ 3Two separate questions
The liability of a supervised institution towards its client and the liability of a supervisory authority are separate questions, governed by different rules. A breach of a supervisory requirement may be relevant evidence in a civil claim against an institution, but it does not by itself establish liability: fault, compensable damage and a causal link must still be shown under the applicable law.
Claims against supervisory authorities are subject to the specific rules of the jurisdiction concerned. In Belgium, for example, Article 68 of the Law of 2 August 2002 provides that the FSMA acts exclusively in the general interest and that it incurs no civil liability for its decisions, acts or conduct in the exercise of its legal tasks except in case of fraud (dol) or gross negligence (faute lourde); a comparable rule applies to the National Bank of Belgium. The compatibility of such limitations with EU law, where a right conferred by EU law is at stake, is discussed in legal literature and must be assessed case by case. The liability of the EU authorities themselves is governed by EU law (Article 340 TFEU for the ECB; Article 69 of the EBA and ESMA Regulations).
Sources and references
- [1]CJEU, Case C-222/02, Peter Paul and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, judgment of 12 October 2004 (Full Court) — EUR-Lex text(opens in a new window)Case law
- [2]Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (SSM Regulation)(opens in a new window)EU law
- [3]Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (EBA Regulation)(opens in a new window)EU law
- [4]Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 (ESMA Regulation)(opens in a new window)EU law
- [5]Belgium — Law of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and on financial services, Article 68(opens in a new window)National law
This content is general legal information. It is not legal advice and does not create a lawyer–client relationship.
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